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Traditionally the corporate ﬁnance literature dealing with the problem of the
concentration of ownership has compared a dispersed ownership structure
where no shareholder has a signiﬁcant stake with a concentrated ownership
structure were a large shareholder eﬀectively controls the ﬁrm 1. The concen-
tration of ownership is seen as a mixed blessing. The controlling shareholder
can monitor managers, thus solving the agency problem between atomistic
shareholders and managers. However, if there are private beneﬁts from con-
trol, the minority shareholders will now be expropriated by the controlling
shareholder who will divert funds towards the generation of private beneﬁts,
taking a disproportionate amount of the corporations ongoing earnings2.
However, many companies have multiple large shareholders. In some
cases we observe a single controlling shareholder, who owns more than 50%
of the voting shares, accompanied by smaller but signiﬁcant shareholders. In
other cases there are multiple controlling shareholders, each of whom holds
a fraction of shares smaller than that necessary for control, while at the
same time, taken together, their fractions are enough to control the com-
pany. Although they can be observed among listed companies, these forms
of ownership structure are specially prevalent in closely-held corporations3.
Still, very little is know about how large shareholders interact and share
1Among the seminal contributions in this literature we ﬁnd Berle and Means (1932);
Jensen and Meckling (1976); Grossman and Hart, (1980); Sheleifer and Vishny (1986) and
Burkart et al. (1997).
2Barclay et al.(1993), Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Zingales (1994) measure
private beneﬁts indirectly by showing that large blocks of ownership that confer voting
rights sell at a premium. Interestingly, Barclay et al. (1989) ﬁnd that the premium is not
only paid for blocks large enough to confer control but also for smaller blocks representing
25% of the equity of a ﬁrm. This suggests that beneﬁts of control are divisible and can be
shared by several large shareholders.
3Becht and Mayer (2002) ﬁnd that more than 25% of listed European companies have
more than one large shareholder. Gomes and Novaes (2001) report that 57.2% of closely-
held corporations with sales above 10 million dollars in the US have more than one large
shareholder.
2power among themselves. Only very recently have a few theoretical papers
started to study how controlling groups are formed when there are multi-
ple large shareholders (Zwiebel, 1995; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) and
which are the eﬀects that the composition of the controlling group (i.e. the
number of members of the controlling group and the concentration of their
respective stakes) may have both on how monitoring is conducted (Pagano
and Röell, 1998) and on the level of private beneﬁt extraction (Bennedsen
and Wolfenzon, 2000; Gomes and Novaes, 2001).
Empirical evidence validating the theoretical predictions that emerge
form these papers is very limited. Volpin (2002) ﬁnds that the market value
of Italian listed ﬁrms is higher for companies with a voting syndicate than
for companies with a single large shareholder. Faccio et al. (2001) com-
pare the dividend policies of listed companies across diﬀerent countries and
ﬁnd that European companies pay higher dividends when they have multiple
large shareholders.. Lehman and Weigand (2000) show that the presence
of a second large shareholder improves the proﬁtability of German listed
companies. These three papers only test whether the presence of multiple
large shareholders can aﬀect performance. Maury and Pajuste (2003) go one
step further by testing whether the stake and type of the shareholders are
important. Using a sample of Finish listed ﬁrms they ﬁnd that ﬁrm value
is positively aﬀected by the presence of a third large shareholder when the
other two have comparable stakes and incentives to collude. All these pa-
pers focus on listed ﬁrms. However, as Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)
argue the presence and power of multiple large shareholders is expected to
be much more important in closely-held corporations, characterized by the
absence of a liquid resale market for their shares and limited external control
mechanisms. This is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst paper that studies how the
structure of controlling groups formed by multiple large shareholders aﬀects
the performance of closely-held ﬁrms.
This paper uses detailed ownership data from Spain to examine how mul-
3tiple large shareholders share control and extract private beneﬁts in closely-
held corporations. The sample consists of a total number of 20313 ﬁrm-year
observations from Spanish ﬁrms during the period 1993 to 2000.
The data give a comprehensive picture of ownership of Spanish ﬁrms, in-
cluding a sub-sample of listed ﬁrms (1% of the ﬁrms). Moreover, the data
set is representative of a country where ownership structure is concentrated
in both in listed and non-listed ﬁrms and legal protection for minority share-
holders is weak, which is the common case in Continental Europe (La Porta
et al. 1999).
We ﬁnd that ownership structures with multiple large shareholders rep-
resent 37.5% of the total and that they are very stable. For each observation
we identify the controlling group as the group of shareholders that are more
likely to form a coalition with enough votes to control the decisions of the
ﬁrm. Each controlling group is characterized by its stake and by its number
of members. We ﬁrst study whether these ownership structures are exoge-
nously given or consciously chosen taking into account ﬁrm characteristics.
We are unable to explain the choice of the ownership structures and interpret
this as evidence that, to a large extent, they are exogenously given.
The main result in the paper is that the structure of the controlling group
has a very signiﬁcant impact on performance. Performance improves as the
control group’s ownership stake increases and, for a given ownership stake,
as the number of members increases. We ﬁnd evidence of the existence of
both, bargaining among controlling shareholders to share private beneﬁts,
and monitoring by non-controlling shareholders to reduce the private bene-
ﬁts of the controlling group. The economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀects indicates
that minority expropriation is a much more important and widespread prob-
lem in closely-held ﬁrms than in listed ﬁrms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the theoretical literature about multiple large shareholders. The data and
variables are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the determinants of
4the ownership structure. The results are presented in Section 5 and Section
6 deals with robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Overview of the theoretical literature on
multiple large shareholders.
While the presence of a majority shareholder is common in many ﬁrms, the
traditional literature on concentrated ownership can not explain satisfactorily
t h ec a s e sw h e r ew eo b s e r v et h ec o - e x i s t e n c eo fm u l t i p l el a r g es h a r e h o l d e r si n
a ﬁr m .H e r ew eb r i e ﬂy review the predictions of the theoretical models that
have considered ownership structures with several large shareholders.
Pagano and Roël (1998) consider a setting in which the manager in con-
trol is a large shareholder who is monitored by other large shareholders. In
this case having two or more large shareholders monitoring the manager re-
sults in free-riding in monitoring but this free-riding enhances value because
it reduces excessive monitoring by a very large shareholder. Therefore, ac-
cording to Pagano and Roël (1998), an ownership structure with several large
shareholders is a commitment device that allows shareholders to commit to
an optimal monitoring intensity. The intuition behind this result is similar to
that in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), where the reduction in the size
of the ownership stake of the unique large shareholder reduces his incentives
to monitor, preserving managerial initiative. A trade-oﬀ between control and
initiative emerges contingent on the outside ownership concentration.
Gomes and Novaes (2001), Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and Zwiebel
(1995) consider a setting in which the ﬁrm is controlled by a group of large
shareholders that together hold the majority of the voting rights.
In Gomes and Novaes (2001) the controlling group, which is formed by all
the large shareholders, will only approve a project if all the members of the
group beneﬁt from the project. For a given ownership stake of the controlling
group, increasing the number of shareholders has two eﬀects. The “bargaining
5eﬀect”, which implies that private beneﬁt taking and rent extraction will be
less likely, since all the members of the control group have to agree on the
preferred project. And the “disagreement eﬀect”, which implies that the
approval of positive net present value projects also becomes more diﬃcult
because of the necessary agreement of all the members of the controlling
group. Gomes and Novaes (2001) show the “bargaining eﬀect”d o m i n a t e s
when there are few shareholders and the “disagreement eﬀect”d o m i n a t e s
when the number of shareholders increases. Also, for a given number of
shareholders in the controlling group increasing the total ownership stake
makes both eﬀects stronger.
In Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) the controlling group will not include
all the large shareholders but will be the result of a coalition formation game
where the diﬀerent large shareholders form coalitions that compete to seize
the control of the ﬁrm. Many diﬀerent coalitions can have suﬃcient voting
power to control the ﬁrm. Ex-ante the optimal coalition is the one with the
largest ownership stake because of an “alignment eﬀect”. The greater the
ownership stake of the controlling coalition the more the coalition internalizes
the cost of dilution. However, ex-post, the preferred coalition will be the one
with the smallest ownership stake necessary to win control. This is the
“coalition formation eﬀect”: given that private beneﬁts come at the expense
of all the non-controlling shareholders, the coalition with the lowest possible
ownership stake will have the largest minority group whom to expropriate.
Zwiebel (1995) assumes that the control beneﬁts will be divided among
the diﬀerent blockholders depending on the relative size of their respective
blocks. Therefore, if one block is much larger than the rest the probability
that the small blockholders can share in the private beneﬁts is reduced. In
equilibrium the investors allocate their money across ﬁrms trying to maxi-
mize their beneﬁts of control. Zwiebel shows that there will exist a threshold
size beyond which the largest blockholder will not be challenged by other
investors. Therefore in equilibrium there are two types of ﬁrms: ﬁrms with
6only one large blockholder, where the size of the block is beyond the thresh-
old, and ﬁrms with several medium size blocks, where the size of the largest
block is below the threshold.
Finally, Bloch and Hege (2001) present a model that considers both the
monitoring and the private beneﬁt sharing problems arising from ownership
structures with multiple large shareholders. In their model there are two
large shareholders that compete for control. The shareholders diﬀer in their
capacity to deﬁne the company’s strategy and in their ability to monitor the
manager. Only the shareholder who wins the control contest deﬁnes the strat-
egy but both shareholders perform a monitoring role. In order to win control
the two large shareholders compete for the votes of the minority by commit-
ting to reduce their private beneﬁts. The model is very rich and diﬀerent
equilibria can be attained depending on the heterogeneity in the monitor-
ing costs and capacity to deﬁne strategy of the two competing shareholders.
The authors conclude that minority expropriation will be lower in companies
where control is more contestable, i.e. companies where the diﬀerence in the
stakes and the abilities of the large shareholders is smaller.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Sample
To test the empirical predictions arising form the diﬀerent theoretical models
we use the 1996 through 2000 SABE databases. These databases, available
from Bureau Van Dick, provide for each year the ownership structure, bal-
ance sheets and income statements for over 190000 Spanish ﬁr m st h a td e p o s i t
their ﬁnancial statements in the Registro Mercantil (95% of all Spanish com-
panies). All Spanish ﬁrms are forced by law to deposit their annual ﬁnancial
statements in this public register. However, the law does not establish a
penalty for not doing it unless the company goes bankrupt. This implies
that not all ﬁrms, especially the smaller ones, comply with this obligation,
7and that the quality of the information provided varies very much from ﬁrm
to ﬁrm. The initial sample has 553595 ﬁrm-year observations. We restrict
t h es a m p l eu s i n gt h r e ec r i t e r i a :w ee l i m i n a t eﬁrms that do not report the
ownership structure, those that do not present detailed ﬁnancial statements,
and those that are not corporations (cooperatives, partnerships, and propri-
etorship). Moreover, these three criteria have to be satisﬁed for at least three
of the four available years. We are left with an incomplete panel with a total
of 5288 diﬀerent ﬁrms and 20313 ﬁrm-year observations.
This database has three main advantages. First, it contains a very com-
plete description of the ownership structure of the ﬁrms. We have the names
and ownership stakes of the shareholders that account for at least 50% of the
shares for 90% of the observations. This allows us to classify the sharehold-
ers into three main types, family, corporation, and other (including ﬁnancial
institutions, state and cooperatives). Ownership by families is aggregated to
include family members with the same surname. Families are assumed to act
collectively. Second, the sample is representative of the total population of
ﬁrms in the economy: only 1% of the ﬁrms are listed in the Madrid Stock
Exchange, 13.5% are close corporations and the remaining 85.5% are open
non-listed ﬁrms. The presence of a sub-sample of listed ﬁrms allows us to
use market data alongside accounting proﬁt measures of ﬁrm performance.
Third, we believe that Spain oﬀers a very interesting case study, given the
dominance of concentrated ownership both in listed and non-listed ﬁrms and
the evidence of weak legal protection for minority shareholders (La Porta et
al. 1999).
3.2 Variables deﬁnition and descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides a description of the variables used in the study and their
summary statistics are shown in Table 2.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]
83.2.1 Ownership structure variables
The ﬁrst group of variables refers to the ownership structure. Following
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) we assume that there will be a controlling
group that will eﬀectively control ﬁrm decisions. Not all the large sharehold-
ers will be part of the controlling group. Among all the possible coalitions
that have a total stake large enough to control the ﬁrm, the one that will
prevail will have the minimum possible stake necessary to win control (here-
after the minimum stake group). For each ﬁrm-year observation we ﬁnd the
minimum stake group and compute its total ownership stake and the number
of members of the group assuming that a stake in excess of 50% is necessary
to win control.
Most previous empirical studies of the impact of ownership concentration
on ﬁr mp e r f o r m a n c eh a v eu s e dt h et o t a lo w n e r s h i ps t a k eo ft h e5l a r g e s t
shareholders as the relevant measure of ownership concentration, assuming
that control is shared equally among this group of shareholders4. To facilitate
the comparison of our results with the results of these previous studies and
to test whether the large shareholders do form control coalitions, we also
use a second deﬁnition of the controlling group as the group of the ﬁve
largest shareholders (hereafter ﬁve largest group). Again, for this alternative
deﬁnition of controlling group we compute the total ownership stake and the
number of members (which may be lower than ﬁve).
Although the ownership stake of the controlling group is a continuous
variable throughout the study we will use three dummy variables, 0-50%,
50-60% and 60-100%, that take the value of one if the ownership stake of
the control group is lower or equal to 50%, between 50 and 60% and higher
than 60% respectively. Controlling groups with a 50 to 60% ownership stake
are of particular interest because they have full control with relatively low
cash-ﬂow rights and, thus, are the most likely to extract private beneﬁts. Our
assumption that more than 50% is necessary to win control is not necessary
4Among them, Demsetz and Villalonga (2003) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
9valid for large ﬁrms, which could be controlled with a lower stake. Moreover,
the ultimate shareholders will be diﬀerent and will have lower cash ﬂow rights
if there are pyramidal ownership structures or dual-class shares. However,
this works in our favor, since it makes it less likely that we ﬁnd evidence
of expropriation for the 50 to 60% group5. The interaction of the 50-60%
dummy with the dummies reﬂecting the number of members of the controlling
group will allow us to test the “bargaining” and “disagreement”e ﬀects of
Gomes and Novaes (2001).
We construct two more ownership variables. Second is a dummy variable
that takes the value one if the second shareholder has an ownership stake
larger than 10%. We will use this variable to test whether large shareholders
that are not in the controlling coalition do eﬀectively monitor the controlling
group and reduce private beneﬁt taking, as suggested by Pagano and Roël
(1998). Contestability measures the relative diﬀerence in the stakes of the
two largest owners. A high value of this variable indicates that the identity of
the largest owner can easily change and less private beneﬁt extraction should
be expected.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 describes the ownership structure of our sample. The results for
the minimum stake group reﬂect that, as could be expected, ownership struc-
ture is very concentrated. In 88.8% the group of large shareholders has an
ownership stake greater than 50%. Interestingly multiple large shareholders
structures are common, 37.5% of the ﬁrms have multiple large shareholders
(ﬁr m sw i t ht w oo rm o r em e m b e r si nt h ec o n t r o l l i n gg r o u pa n dﬁrms with only
one controlling shareholder accompanied by a signiﬁcant second shareholder).
5If there are pyramidal structures or dual-class shares (which is unlikely for closely-held
ﬁrms), expropriation will occur even for ownership stakes between 60 and 100%, because
ultimate cash ﬂow rights would be lower than that. If the ﬁrm can be controlled with
a stake lower than 50% we would expect to ﬁnd more expropriation for ﬁrms where the
controlling group has an ownership stake lower than 50%.
10We ﬁnd two types of ﬁrms with multiple large shareholders. The ﬁrst
type, with 19.9% of the ﬁrms, has a controlling group with two or more
members, none of whom by itself has a majority stake. The second type,
with 17.6% of the ﬁrms, has a ﬁrst shareholder who controls the ﬁrm, owning
more than 50% of the shares, but is accompanied by (at least) a second large
non-controlling shareholder. Pagano and Roëll (1998) and Bloch and Hege
(2001) predict that the presence of these non-controlling shareholders adds
value because they have the role of monitoring the controlling one. Moreover,
this distribution of ﬁrms according to their ownership structure is inconsis-
tent with Zwiebel’s (1995) model. According to Zwiebel ﬁrms should fall into
one of two categories: ﬁrms with a single controlling shareholder possibly ac-
companied by small non-controlling shareholders (53.9% in our sample) and
ﬁrms with no single controlling shareholder and multiple large sharehold-
ers with similar stakes (19.9% in our sample). The existence of ﬁrms with
a single controlling shareholder accompanied by other large non-controlling
shareholders (17.6%) is not predicted by Zwiebel’s (1995) equilibrium model,
based solely on minority expropriation considerations.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The ownership structure is very stable. Table 4 shows the percentage of
ﬁrms that change category within three years. Even after three years only
16.18% of the ﬁrms experiment an important change in ownership. It is also
worth noticing that ﬁrms where the controlling group has an ownership stake
in the 50-60% range are most likely to change towards a more concentrated
ownership structure. It is tempting to interpret this as evidence of the inef-
ﬁciency of this type of ownership structures, however the result may simply
be due to the small ownership range that we are considering.
3.2.2 Performance variables
We will use return on assets (ROA) as our measure of performance. Gilson
and Gordon (2003) argue that the main source of private beneﬁte x t r a c t i o n
11are usually the direct dealings of the controlling shareholders with the con-
trolled ﬁrm, such as unfair transfer pricing, transfer of assets from the con-
trolled corporation to the controlling shareholder, the use of the controlled
ﬁrm’s assets as collateral for a controlling shareholder debt, etc. Thus minor-
ity expropriation problems are likely to be reﬂected either in lower revenues,
excessive production costs or in the ineﬃcient employment of assets. These
things will result in a reduction in margins or asset rotation and, in turn,
lower margins and/or lower asset rotation will be reﬂected in a lower ROA.
To control for industry and year ﬁxed eﬀe c t sw ew i l lu s et h ed i ﬀerence with
respect to median ROA by 4-digit sector and year. For the sub-sample of
listed ﬁrms we will also use Tobin’s Q.
3.2.3 Control variables
In order to study the eﬀects that ownership structure may have on perfor-
mance, we need to control for ﬁrm characteristics that may have a simulta-
neous eﬀect on both ownership structure and performance, since, otherwise,
we may be identifying only a spurious correlation. The use of panel data
allows us to control for ﬁrm characteristics that are stable in time but we
still need to control for changing ﬁrm characteristics. In particular, we need
to control for changing ﬁrm characteristics that can aﬀect the likelihood of
private beneﬁt extraction, because the diﬀerent theoretical models predict
that ﬁrms where private beneﬁt extraction is likely to be important should
chose a diﬀerentiated ownership structure.
As the cost of monitoring increases, the non-controlling shareholders have
less incentives to monitor and the likelihood of expropriation increases. As
proxies for the cost of monitoring we use ﬁrm’s size, (measured as the log
of assets), age and assets’ intangibility (the ratio of intangible assets over
total assets). We expect larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with more intangible assets
to be more diﬃcult to monitor. The relationship between age and the cost of
monitoring is expected to be negative: younger ﬁrms should be more diﬃcult
12to monitor since there are no past records of performance.
If the rents available for distribution among shareholders are large, ex-
propriation is more tempting and less likely to be detected. Therefore, we
expect ﬁrms with large rents to be more likely to suﬀer minority expropria-
tion problems. Leverage, and product market competition (measured by the
Herﬁndhal index of sales) reduce the rents that can be expropriated, while
growth opportunities (measured by the 4-digit industry growth in sales) in-
crease them.
4 Determinants of the controlling group’s struc-
ture
We ﬁrst investigate whether the structure of the controlling group is con-
sciously chosen by the initial owners. If this were the case we would expect
that ﬁrms whose characteristics make them more likely to suﬀer expropria-
tion problems to chose a larger controlling group with a larger joint stake
(Gomes and Novaes, 2001; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000).
Notice that if the composition of the controlling group is chosen in aware-
ness of its consequences for performance, then performance and the struc-
ture of the controlling group should be unrelated. However, there are rea-
sons to think that the composition of the controlling group is (partially)
pre-determined by exogenous factors. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) argue that
potential changes in the ownership structure that could improve performance
are likely to be blocked by the parties that have the incentives and power to
impede them. In our case the incumbent controlling shareholders both have
the power and the incentives to prevent those changes. To the extent that
the ownership structure is given exogenously we would still expect it to have
signiﬁcant eﬀects on performance.
We examine the relationship between control group composition and ﬁrm
characteristics by estimating a multinomial logit model for the probability
13of choosing a particular controlling group’s structure. Our explanatory vari-
ables are the control variables, deﬁned in the previous section, that make
private beneﬁt extraction more or less likely: size, age, intangibility, lever-
age, Herﬁndhal and growth. This last variable also proxies for the importance
of disagreement costs, because deadlocks in decision making are more costly
for ﬁrms with growth opportunities.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The results indicate that, as we expected, larger ﬁrms, younger ﬁrms, un-
listed ﬁrms whose shares are not liquid and ﬁrms operating in concentrated
industries are less likely to have controlling groups with, potentially danger-
ous, small ownership stakes. Assets intangibility and sector’s growth do not
seem to be important determinants of the ownership structure. Finally, we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the probability of having a controlling
group with a stake lower than 50% and between 50 and 60%6.
Overall these results conﬁrm our expectations. Firms with diﬀerent char-
acteristics adjust, to a certain extent, the composition for their controlling
groups so as to prevent minority expropriation problems. However, the low
R2 indicates that we can explain only a very small fraction of the cross-section
variability in the composition of the controlling group. As we expected the
composition of the controlling group is, to a large extent, pre-determined
by the initial conditions and by exogenous factors such as the wealth, risk-
aversion and/or liquidity needs of the initial owners.
5 Performance eﬀects of the controlling group’s
structure
We now examine the relation between the structure of the controlling group
and performance. The results from the previous section indicate that there
6Breaking up the 50 to 60% group into three groups depending on the number of
members (1, 2 and 3 or more) produces similar results for the three groups.
14are exogenous factors that largely determine the composition of the control-
ling group. This means that the eﬀects of lower controlling stakes and smaller
controlling groups are not totally compensated by ﬁrm characteristics that
reduce the likelihood of expropriation. Therefore, we expect the composition
of the controlling group to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the degree of minority
expropriation that will be reﬂected in performance.
We estimate regressions of performance, measured by ROA on the own-
ership stake and number of members of the controlling group. We also in-
clude the variables that proxy for the likelihood of expropriation as control
variables. We use two diﬀerent speciﬁcations for the controlling group: the
minimum stake group and the ﬁve largest shareholders group.
The panel structure of our data allows us to exploit the time variability of
the sample to control for potential unobservable heterogeneity and spurious
correlation problems that may be present in this regression model. We pro-
ceed in the following way. First we estimated a simple regression model with
the variables in levels and estimate heterocedasticity robust White standard
errors. If there are some unobservable ﬁrm characteristics that are correlated
both with the ownership structure and the performance of the ﬁrm (e.g. man-
agement quality), the coeﬃcient estimates in this regression are biased. To
correct for this potential problem we reestimated our model with the vari-
ables in ﬁrst diﬀerences, i.e. we estimated a ﬁxed eﬀects model. Hausman
t e s t si n d i c a t ew h e t h e rt h ec o e ﬃcients in the simple regression model were in
fact biased. When this is the case we report ﬁxed eﬀects results, otherwise
we report the more eﬃcient simple regression results.
The results for the minimum stake group and ﬁve largest shareholders
group are presented in Tables 6(a) and 6(b) respectively. They are quite
similar and our comments will refer to the minimum stake group speciﬁcation.
[ I n s e r tT a b l e s6 ( a )a n d6 ( b )a b o u th e r e ]
There are 3 diﬀerent speciﬁcations in each table. The dependent variable
is always the diﬀerence in ROA with respect to the 4-digit industry-year
15median. The ownership structure is captured by the dummies indicating the
ownership stake and number of members of the controlling group7.
The coeﬃcient for the 0-50% dummy is always negative and signiﬁcant
indicating that companies with low ownership concentration perform worst
than companies with ownership concentration in the 60-100% range. This
may be due either to agency problems or to minority expropriation problems,
since both result in private beneﬁt extraction either by the manager or by
the large shareholders.
The coeﬃcient on the 0-50% dummy is not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst speciﬁ-
cation. However it becomes negative and both, statistically and economically,
signiﬁcant when we interact it with the 1M dummy in the second speciﬁca-
tion.. If a ﬁrm in the 60-100% range has an adjusted ROA of 5%, a similar
ﬁrm with one controlling shareholder with an ownership stake in the 50 to
60% range will have an adjusted ROA of only 3,8% (5%-1.2%). The co-
eﬃcient on the 0-50%*1M dummy being larger in absolute value than the
coeﬃcient on the 0-50% dummy clearly indicates that controlling sharehold-
ers use their power to expropriate minority shareholders. Interestingly, ﬁrms
with a controlling group with an ownership stake in the 50 to 60% range
but more than one member do not perform worst that the control group of
ﬁrms in the 60 to 100% range. Therefore, the presence of multiple controlling
shareholders reduces expropriation. This provides support for the existence
of the “bargaining” eﬀect predicted by Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and
Gomes and Novaes (2001). We do not ﬁnd evidence of the existence of the
“disagreement” eﬀects predicted by Gomes and Novaes (2001), since perfor-
mance does not deteriorate for ﬁrms with 3 or more controlling shareholders.
This may be due to the fact that there are very few ﬁrms with more than
four controlling shareholders, and disagreement problems may appear only
f o rl a r g e rg r o u p s .
7An alternative speciﬁcation with countinuous variables within each range produces
similar results but the coeﬃcients for the dummy variables are easier to interpret.
16In the third speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that minority expropriation is especially
severe when there are no signiﬁcant shareholders other than the single con-
trolling shareholder, i.e. when 0-50%*1M*(1-second) t a k e st h ev a l u eo n e .
This indicates that non-controlling shareholders play a monitoring role that
can make private beneﬁt extraction more costly for the controlling share-
holder, as hypothesized by Pagano and Röel (1998). In this speciﬁcation
we also introduce the contestability variable suggested by Block and Hedge
(2001), which has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on performance. The sim-
ilarity in the stakes of the ﬁrst and second shareholders is likely to enhance
both the bargaining power (if the second shareholder is in the controlling
group) and the monitoring incentives (if he is not) of the second shareholder.
This results in a reduction of private beneﬁt extraction.
Finally, most of the control variables are signiﬁcant indicating that, ce-
teris paribus, larger, younger and less indebted ﬁrms perform better than
other ﬁrms in their industry. A high value of intangibility has a negative
eﬀect on performance, which may reﬂect a low collateral value of assets and
diﬃculties for accessing the credit market. It is diﬃcult to interpret the posi-
tive coeﬃcient on the Herﬁndahl value, which may be due to large diﬀerences
in ROA among ﬁrms in concentrated industries.
The extend of the minority expropriation problem that we have identiﬁed
may depend on ﬁrm characteristics that can make private beneﬁte x t r a c t i o n
more likely such as the size of the ﬁrm, the diﬃculties for trading shares, the
ownership status of the CEO and the identity of the largest shareholder. In
order to capture the potential diﬀerences we break our sample according to
the proposed characteristics and reestimate our model for each sub-sample.
The results are reported in Tables 7(a), 7(b), 7(c) and 7(d).8
[Insert Table 7(a) about here]
Table 7(a) shows the results depending on the size of the ﬁrm. Both small
8We only report the results for the controlling group deﬁned as the minimum stake
group. Results for the 5 largest shareholders group are very similar.
17and medium size ﬁrms seem to have important minority expropriation prob-
lems, with a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the 50-60%*1M dummy.
For medium ﬁrms the coeﬃcient on the 0-50% dummy is also negative, in-
dicating that these ﬁrms may be controlled with a stake lower than 50%
or that medium ﬁrms without controlling groups may suﬀer agency costs.
However, we ﬁnd no eﬀects for the size of the controlling stake in the largest
ﬁrms. This is surprising, since one would expect large ﬁrms, which are more
diﬃcult to monitor, to be more likely to suﬀer agency and minority expropri-
ation problems. The reason for this may be that there are very few ﬁrms in
the reference range (ﬁr m sw i t hac o n t r o l l i n gg r o u pw i t ha6 0t o1 0 0 %s t a k e ) .
Nevertheless we still ﬁnd the positive eﬀects of having multiple controlling
shareholders.
[Insert Table 7(b) about here]
In Table 7(b) we report the results depending on the trading restrictions
that the shareholders face. In close corporations trading is restricted to in-
cumbent shareholders and a shareholder can only sell his stake to an outsider
with the agreement of the other shareholders. The reduced liquidity of the
s h a r e sm a k e sm i n o r i t ys h a r e h o l d e r sm o r ev u l n e r a b l et oe x p r o p r i a t i o n .O p e n
ﬁrms are an intermediate case where the shares can be freely traded, but
since they are not listed in the stock exchange, transaction costs are likely to
be large. For listed ﬁrms shares can be freely traded on the stock exchange.
Moreover, the strict information requirements that listed ﬁrms have to com-
ply with and the public scrutiny to which they are subject, make them less
likely to suﬀer from minority expropriation problems. This is reﬂe c t e di nt h e
estimation results. Minority expropriation is much more severe in close ﬁrms
than in open ﬁrms, and we ﬁnd no evidence of minority expropriation for
listed ﬁrms.
[Insert Table 7(c) about here]
T a b l e7 ( c )r e p o r t st h er e s u l t sd e p e nding on the CEO’s ownership status.
18We would expect that, when there is one controlling shareholder with an
intermediate ownership stake who is also the CEO, expropriation should be
more severe, since he can eﬀectively control the day-to-day decisions of the
ﬁrm. We would also expect that if the CEO is not the largest shareholder, but
has an ownership stake in the company, his bargaining power vis-a-vis other
large shareholders may reduce minority expropriation. This is consistent
with the results that indicate important minority expropriation problems for
both, ﬁrms where the CEO owns no shares and for ﬁrms where the CEO is
t h el a r g e s to w n e r ,b u tn o tf o rﬁrms where the CEO has a non-controlling
ownership stake. It is also worth noticing that ﬁrms where the CEO owns
no shares perform signiﬁcantly worst than other ﬁrms (with a large, negative
and signiﬁcant intercept), which could indicate the lack of incentives that
the CEO has to improve performance.
[Insert Table 7(d) about here]
The results for the identity of the largest shareholder appear in Table
7(d). Gilson and Gordon (2003) suggest that controlling shareholders can be
classiﬁed in two groups: those whose only connection to the ﬁrm is through
its shareholdings and those who also have operational ties to the ﬁrm, say as
a customer or supplier. The former have fewer direct means to extract private
beneﬁts than the later. Taking into account this distinction one would expect
that ﬁrms controlled by other ﬁrms, who are likely to have commercial ties
with it, are more likely to suﬀer minority expropriation than ﬁrms controlled
by families. This is conﬁrmed by the results in Table 7(d), where the coef-
ﬁcient on the 0-50%*1M*(1-second) dummy is negative but not signiﬁcant
for families but is very large and signiﬁcant for ﬁrms. The results for other
types of shareholders are diﬃcult to interpret. This is a diverse group with
t h es t a t ea st h em o s tf r e q u e n to w n e r ,f o l l o w e db yﬁnancial institutions. The
large and negative intercept indicates that these ﬁrms perform much worst
than other ﬁrms, which may be the reason why the state or the ﬁnancial
institution became or remain as large shareholders.
196 Robustness checks
6.1 Results for listed ﬁrms
The main focus of this paper is to investigate how multiple large shareholders
share control and extract private beneﬁts in closely-held corporations, where
minority expropriation problems are most likely to be severe. ROA is the
obvious measure of performance for these ﬁrms. However our sample con-
tains a small sub-sample of listed ﬁrms. For these ﬁr m sw eh a v em a r k e td a t a
a n dw ec a nu s eT o b i n ’ sQa st h em e a s u r eo fp e r f o r m a n c e .A sD e m s e t za n d
Villalonga (2003) point out there are no clear a priori reasons why we should
prefer one measure of performance over the other. ROA is aﬀected by ac-
counting practices which may hide expropriation, but Tobin’s Q will also be
subject to accounting problems if investors use past performance information
to infer the future. Moreover, Tobins’ Q is forward-looking, reﬂecting expec-
tations of private beneﬁt extraction, while ROA, being backward-looking,
should reﬂect eﬀective minority expropriation. Nevertheless it is interesting
to test the robustness of our results using both measures.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
T a b l e8r e p o r t st h ee s t i m a t i o nr e s u l t sf o rt h es a m p l eo fl i s t e dﬁrms using
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. These results can be compared to the
results reported in Table 7(b) where, using ROA as the dependent variable,
we found no evidence of expropriation for listed ﬁrms. The results for the
minimum stake group in Table 8 indicate that companies where the large
shareholders own less than 50% perform better than other ﬁrms. This is
probably due to the fact that ﬁrms with a diluted ownership structure, where
expropriation is most unlikely to occur, are included in the 0 to 50% range.
The second interesting result is that for a controlling stake between 50 and
60%, ﬁrms with three of more shareholders in the controlling group perform
better, which conﬁrms that multiple large shareholders may prevent minority
expropriation.
20We do not ﬁnd any results when we deﬁne the controlling group as the
group of the ﬁve largest shareholders, which could indicate that, as predicted
by Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), large shareholders do in fact form coali-
tions in order to control the ﬁrm, and that this has to be taken into account
when studying the eﬀects of the ownership structure on ﬁrm performance.
6.2 Reverse causality
When we deﬁned our control variables we explained that the use of panel
data allows us to control for spurious correlation. A second potential econo-
metric problem that may arise in the estimation of the relationship between
ownership structure and performance is the reverse causality problem, i.e.
rather than identifying the eﬀect of ownership on performance we may be
identifying the eﬀect of performance on the ownership structure. Himmelberg
et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2003) claim that insiders superior
information about future performance creates an incentive for varying their
stakes.
This problem could be solved by introducing instruments in our estima-
tions, i.e. variables correlated with the current ownership structure but not
with current performance. The obvious candidates are lagged values of the
ownership variables, but they are not good instruments for our sample be-
cause ownership structures are very stable. However, it is very unlikely that
reverse causality may be a mayor problem for our sample of closely-held ﬁrms.
First, ownership structures are very stable, while the within ﬁrm variability
of ROA is large. Second, the results in Section 3 indicate that ownership
structures are, to a large extent, pre-determined by the initial conditions
and by exogenous factors. Finally, the absence of a liquid market in which
shares may be traded makes it very unlikely that large shareholders can trade
on the basis of short or medium term expectations about earnings.
217C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we evaluate empirically the role of concentrated ownership
structures with multiple large shareholders for a sample of closely-held Span-
ish ﬁrms for the years 1996 through 2000. We test the empirical predictions
of the diﬀerent theoretical models that try to explain the existence, the func-
tioning and the consequences of this type of ownership structures.
We capture the complexity of the ownership structure using two vari-
ables: the ownership stake and the number of members of the controlling
group. The controlling group is deﬁned alternatively as the minimum stake
coalition of large shareholders that can eﬀectively control the ﬁrm and as
the group of the ﬁve largest shareholders. We ﬁnd that ownership structures
with multiple large shareholders are common (37.5% of the sample) and that
ownership structures are very stable (with only 16.18% of the ﬁrms experi-
encing important changes in ownership over a three year period). We inves-
tigate whether ﬁr m sw h o s ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c sm a k et h e mm o r el i k e l yt os u ﬀer
minority expropriationp r o b l e m sc h o o s ed i ﬀerent ownership structures. Our
results indicate that ﬁrms with higher monitoring costs and / or larger rents,
as measured by ﬁrm size, age, listing status and by the industry’s Herﬁndhal
index of sales concentration are more likely to have a controlling group with
a larger stake. However, these variables can only explain a small part of the
cross sectional variability in ownership structures.
When we study the eﬀects of ownership structure on performance we ﬁnd
evidence of private beneﬁts extraction by controlling groups with intermedi-
ate ownership stakes, i.e. ownership stakes large enough to confer control of
the decisions of the ﬁrm but too small to force the controlling shareholders
to internalize the costs of expropriation. The presence of more than one con-
trolling shareholder substantially decreases private beneﬁte x t r a c t i o n . W e
interpret this as evidence of the bargaining for private beneﬁts that occurs
among the large shareholders that are forced to share control. The pres-
ence of large shareholders outside the controlling group also has a positive
22eﬀect on performance, which we attribute to the monitoring role that they
can perform. These bargaining and monitoring eﬀects are stronger when the
stakes of the ﬁrst and second shareholders are of similar size, i.e. when the
ownership structure is more contestable.
Moreover, minority expropriation is more pronounced when (i) the liq-
uidity of the shares is restricted, (ii) the CEO does not own shares or the
CEO is the controlling shareholder and (iii) the largest shareholder is a ﬁrm
that may have commercial ties with the controlled ﬁrm.
Overall our results indicate that, when studying the impact of owner-
ship on performance, it is important to take into account the structure of
the controlling coalitions that large shareholders will form, in terms of their
ownership stake and number of members. Finally, the economic signiﬁcance
of the results indicates that minority expropriation in closely-held ﬁrms is
an important and widespread problem that has not yet received enough at-
tention from empirical researchers, who have mainly focused on studying the
problems of listed ﬁrms.
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Minimum stake group Coalition formed by the shareholders whose joint ownership
s t a k ei st h em i n i m u ms t a k el a r g e rt h a n5 0 % .
5 Largest group Group formed by the 5 largest shareholders.
Ownership stake of controlling group:
0-50% Dummy variable that is 1 if the ownership stake of the
controlling group is lower or equal to 50%, 0 otherwise.
50-60% Dummy variable that is 1 if the ownership stake of the
controlling group is in the 50-60% range, 0 otherwise.
6 0 - 1 0 0 % D u m m yv a r i a b l et h a ti s1i ft h eo w n e r s h i ps t a k eo ft h e
controlling group is larger or equal to 60%, 0 otherwise.
Number of members of the controlling group:
1 M D u m m yv a r i a b l et h a ti s1i ft h en u m b e ro fm e m b e r so ft h e
controlling group is 1, 0 otherwise.
2 M D u m m yv a r i a b l et h a ti s1i ft h en u m b e ro fm e m b e r so ft h e
controlling group is 2, 0 otherwise.
3 M D u m m yv a r i a b l et h a ti s1i ft h en u m b e ro fm e m b e r so ft h e
controlling group is 3 or more, 0 otherwise.
Additional ownership variables:
Second Dummy variable that is 1 if the second largest shareholder
has an ownership stake larger than 10%.
Contestability Ratio of 1 minus the % joint ownership stake of the two largest
shareholders divided by 100 times the diﬀerence in their stakes.
Performance variables:
ROA 4 digit industry and year adjusted return on assets computed
as the ratio of EBITDA over book value of assets.
Tobin’s Q Year-end market value of equity plus book value of debt over
book value of total assets.
Control variables:
Size Logarithm of total assets.
Age Years since foundation.
Intangibility Intangible assets over total assets.
Listed Dummy variable that is 1 if the ﬁrm is listed in the Madrid
Stock Exchange, 0 otherwise.
Leverage Total book value of liabilities over total assets.
Herﬁndahl 4 digit industry Herﬁndahl index of sales concetration.
Growth 4 digit industry % chage in sales year-on-year.
27Table 2
Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean St.dev. Min Median Max
Ownership stake:
Minimum stake group% 20313 79.00 26.59 0.01 94 100
5 largest group 20313 86.86 25.98 0.01 100 100
Number of members:
Minimum stake group% 18041 1.36 1.22 1 1 10
5 largest group 20313 1.83 1.17 1 1 5
Contestability 20313 0.05 0.14 0 0 0.99
ROA% 20313 9.50 13.25 -365.20 8.23 170.55
ROA% (adjusted) 20313 0.37 12.69 -372.65 -0.44 158.07
Tobin’s Q 211 2.03 3.08 0.18 1.21 25.08
Assets (thousands of euros) 20313 23100 13700 1.77 7853 7830000
Size (log of assets) 20313 15.98 1.16 7.47 15.87 22.78
Age 20313 19.27 13.80 0 16 112
Intangibility% 20313 11.19 18.62 0 2.19 100
Listed 20313 0.003 0.05 0 0 1
Leverage% 20313 53.62 75.06 0 56.82 9791.475
Herﬁndahl 20313 0.17 0.25 0.001 0.06 1
Growth% 20313 12.38 80.68 -27.06 10.62 6629.82
28Table 3
Prevalence of multiple large shareholders





1( n os i g n i ﬁcant second) 8.6% 2.6% 51.3%
1( s i g n i ﬁcant second) 6.2% 11.2%
2 1.9% 5.5% 7.7%
3 or more 0.7% 3.5% 0.6%





1 8.6% 2.3% 43.7%
2 1.9% 0.54% 22.4%
3 or more 0.7% 0.56% 19.3%
%o fﬁrms in each cathegory. We consider the second shareholder
as signiﬁcant if his ownership stake is equal or larger than 10%.
29Table 4
Stability of ownership structure
Control group deﬁned as minimum stake group
Ownership stake year t
0-50% 50-60% 60-100%
9% 24% 67%
Ownership stake year t+3
0-50% 70% 5% 2%
50-60% 10% 55% 2%
60-100% 20% 40% 96%
Control group deﬁned as 5 largest shareholders group
Ownership stake year t
0-50% 50-60% 60-100%
9% 3% 88%
Ownership stake year t+3
0-50% 69% 3% 3%
50-60% 3% 40% 1%
60-100% 28% 57% 96%
%o fﬁrms moving from one cathegory to the other.
30Table 5
Determinants of ownership structure
Model 1 Model 2
Controlling group: Minimum stake 5 Largest
Regression type: Multinomial Logit Multinomial Logit
State: 0-50% 50-60% 60-100% 0-50% 50-60% 60-100%
Size -0.008 (0.003)∗∗∗ -0.025 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.034 (0.004)∗∗∗ -0.008 (0.003)∗∗∗ -0.009 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.0178 (0.003)∗∗∗
Age 0.023 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.010 (0.005)∗ -0.033 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.022 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.001 (0.002) -0.024 (0.004)∗∗∗
Intangibility -0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0006 (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0006) -0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0005)
Listed -0.001 (0.049) 0.427 (0.103)∗∗∗ -0.426 (0.091)∗∗∗ 0.042 (0.058) 0.151 (0.100) -0.194 (0.112)∗
Leverage -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.006) -0.003 (0.005) -0.004 (0.003) 0.007 (0.006)
Herﬁndahl -0.003 (0.0007)∗∗∗ -0.003 (0.0008)∗∗∗ 0.006 (0.0009)∗∗∗ -0.003 (0.0007)∗∗∗ -0.001 (0.0004)∗∗∗ 0.004 (0.0008)∗∗∗
Growth 0.0004 (0.001) -0.004 (0.007) 0.004 (0.006) -0.0001 (0.0004) -0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002)




Number of obs. 20313 20313
Quasi-elasticities at the sample median, indicating the percentage point change in the probability of the state upon a 1% increase in the
explanatory variable. Model 1 deﬁnes controlling group as the minimum stake group, while Model 2 deﬁnes the controlling group as the
5 largest shareholdersgroup. *,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.Table 6 (a)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA





50-60%*2M -0.28 (0.46) -0.52 (0.48)
50-60%*3M 0.40 (0.52) 0.06 (0.55)
Contestability 1.80 (0.77)∗∗
Size 0.91 (0.21)∗∗∗ 0.91 (0.21)∗∗∗ 0.92 (0.21)∗∗∗
Age -0.24 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.24 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.23 (0.04)∗∗∗
Intangibility -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗
Listed -7.53 (5.14) -7.82 (5.14) -8.00 (5.14)
Leverage -0.036 (0.001)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗
Herﬁndahl 1.68 (0.29)∗∗∗ 1.68 (0.29)∗∗∗ 1.65 (0.29)∗∗∗
Growth 0.007 (0.014) 0.007 (0.01) 0.008 (0.01)
Intercept -7.53 (3.21)∗∗ -7.63 (3.21)∗∗ -7.87 (3.22)∗∗
R2 0.114 0.114 0.115
F-value 215.18∗∗∗ 176.74∗∗∗ 150.40∗∗∗
Hausman 176.63∗∗∗ 186.02∗∗∗ 199.76∗∗∗
Number of obs. 20313 20313 20313
Controlling group deﬁned as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
32Table 6 (b)
5 largest shareholders controlling group and ROA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Controlling group: 5 Largest 5 Largest 5 Largest
Regression type: Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -0.78 (0.36)∗∗ -0.71 (0.36)∗ -0.90 (0.37)∗
50-60% -1.34 (0.51)∗∗
50-60%*1M -2.16 (0.66)∗∗∗ -2.15 (0.66)∗∗∗
50-60%*1M*(1-Second)
50-60%*1M*Second
50-60%*2M -0.43 (1.12) -0.54 (1.12)
50-60%*3M 1.17 (1.11) -0.06 (1.12)
Contestability 1.79 (0.73)∗∗∗
Size 0.91 (0.21)∗∗∗ 0.91 (0.21)∗∗∗ 0.92 (0.21)∗∗∗
Age -0.23 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.23 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.22 (0.04)∗∗∗
Intangibility -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗
Listed -7.66 (5.14) -7.63 (5.14) -7.92 (0.14)
Leverage -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗
Herﬁndahl 1.66 (0.29)∗∗∗ 1.65 (0.29)∗∗∗ 1.65 (0.29)∗∗∗
Growth 0.008 (0.014) 0.008 (0.01) 0.009 (0.01)
Intercept -7.72 (3.21)∗∗ -7.74 (3.21)∗∗ -8.14 (3.21)∗∗
R2 0.114 0.114 0.115
F-value 215.66∗∗∗ 176.84∗∗∗ 162.66∗∗∗
Hausman 186.91∗∗∗ 196.27∗∗∗ 196.92∗∗∗
Number of obs. 20313 20313 20313
Controlling group deﬁned as the 5 largest shareholders group.*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
33Table 7 (a)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA by ﬁrm’s size
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Sub-sample: Small ﬁrms Medium ﬁrms Large ﬁrms
Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -1.11 (0.84) -1.28 (0.57)∗∗ -0.93 (1.17)
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) -2.38 (1.21)∗∗ -1.92 (0.95)∗∗ -0.92 (2.42)
50-60%*1M*Second -1.17 (0.84) -0.89 (0.67) 1.65 (1.66)
50-60%*2M -1.35 (0.94) -0.62 (0.68) 3.53 (1.75)∗∗
50-60%*3M -0.91 (1.10) -0.64 (0.75) 3.32 (1.97)∗
Contestability 1.92 (1.60) 2.21 (1.02)∗∗ 0.45 (2.51)
Size 2.49 (0.51)∗∗∗ 0.14 (0.35) -0.78 (0.61)
Age -0.38 (0.11)∗∗∗ -0.15 (0.07)∗∗ -0.03 (0.08)
Intangibility -0.03 (0.01)∗∗ -0.02 (0.01)∗ 0.05 (0.03)∗
Listed -9.49 (6.73) -5.05 (6.56)
Leverage -0.03 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.05 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.11 (0.01)∗∗∗
Herﬁndahl 1.84 (0.65)∗∗∗ 1.42 (0.40)∗∗∗ 2.83 (0.74)∗∗∗
Growth 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) 0.09 (0.04)∗∗
Intercept -28.55 (7.27)∗∗∗ 3.76 (5.30) 17.90 (10.36)∗
R2 0.015 0.017 0.097
F-value 5.47∗∗∗ 9.44∗∗∗ 12.21∗∗∗
Hausman 79.56∗∗∗ 17.63∗∗∗ 27.83∗∗∗
Number of obs. 6448 10176 2204
Small ﬁrms have less than 50 workers and total assets bellow 10 million euros. Large ﬁrms
have more than 250 workers or assets above 100 million euros. Controlling group deﬁned
as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
34Table 7 (b)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA by ﬁrm’s type
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Sub-sample: Closed ﬁrms Open ﬁrms Listed ﬁrms
Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -2.13 (1.72) -1.03 (0.42)∗∗ -1.03 (2.71)
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) -8.83 (2.36)∗∗∗ -1.49 (0.69)∗∗ -1.13 (3.18)
50-60%*1M*Second 0.62 (1.66) -1.03 (0.48)∗∗ -2.11 (6.18)
50-60%*2M -0.85 (1.74) -0.54 (0.50) 1.70 (2.90)
50-60%*3M 0.02 (2.55) 0.10 (0.56) -2.40 (2.56)
Contestability 0.27 (2.88) 1.96 (0.80)∗∗ -2.20 (2.41)
Size 2.15 (0.64)∗∗∗ 0.73 (0.23)∗∗∗ 0.16 (1.26)
Age -0.69 (0.21)∗∗∗ -0.20 (0.05)∗∗∗ 0.07 (0.36)
Intangibility -0.08 (0.02)∗∗∗ -0.01 (0.01) -0.07 (0.09)
Leverage -0.04 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.07 (0.05)
Herﬁndahl 2.52 (0.91)∗∗ 1.61 (0.31)∗∗∗ 1.74 (2.28)
Growth 0.03 (0.06) 0.01 (0.02) -0.04 (0.06)
Intercept -20.38 (8.89)∗∗ -5.60 (3.47) 1.45 (22.34)
R2 0.03 0.13 0.10
F-value 5.08∗∗∗ 168.12∗∗∗ 0.99
Hausman 48.54∗∗∗ 177.73∗∗∗ 22.79∗∗
Number of obs. 2754 17338 211
Controlling group deﬁned as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
35Table 7 (c)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA by CEO’s ownership status








Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed eﬀects OLS Fixed eﬀects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -1.58 (1.24) -1.70 (2.16) -1.30 (0.57)∗∗
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) -2.34 (1.20)∗ -0.77 (3.97) -2.24 (0.91)∗∗
50-60%*1M*Second 0.19 (1.29) 0.01 (1.16) -1.62 (0.74)∗∗
50-60%*2M 0.61 (1.74) —2.34 (1.24)∗ -0.60 (0.80)
50-60%*3M 3.34 (3.22) —1.51 (1.30) 0.22 (0.87)
Contestability 2.72 (4.42) -1.70 (3.11) 1.27 (1.18)
Size 0.33 (0.52) 1.03 (0.42)∗∗ 1.61 (0.28)∗∗∗
Age 0.40 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.002 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.21 (0.06)∗∗∗
Intangibility -0.02 (0.02) 0.003 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01)
Listed -12.97 (10.22) -7.18 (6.24)
Leverage -0.05 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.15 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗
Herﬁndahl 1.43 (0.54)∗∗ 2.69 (0.94)∗∗∗ 1.75 (0.40)∗∗∗
Growth 0.10 (0.05)∗ 0.03 (0.05) 0.00 (0.02)
Intercept -10.75 (8.37) -7.05 (6.58) -19.44 (4.35)∗∗∗
R2 0.02 0.17 0.15
F-value / χ2 5.02∗∗∗ 186.49 128.75∗∗∗
Hausman 30.12∗∗∗ 17.47 192.87∗∗∗
Number of obs. 4065 848 14027
Controlling group deﬁned as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
36Table 7 (d)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA by largest shareholder’s type
M o d e l1 M o d e l2 M o d e l3
Sub-sample: Family Firm Other
Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects OLS
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -1.78 (0.01)∗∗ -0.86 (0.21) 9.86 (4.73)∗
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) -1.00 (0.30) -3.65 (0.00)∗∗∗ 1.03 (5.49)
50-60%*1M*Second -0.37 (0.49) -2.81 (0.00)∗∗∗ 4.07 (3.90)
50-60%*2M -0.69 (0.22) -0.64 (0.51) 2.27 (5.59)
50-60%*3M -0.11 (0.87) 0.72 (0.51) 2.63 (6.47)
Contestability 2.41 (0.02)∗∗ 0.98 (0.49) 4.37 (10.50)
Size 0.99 (0.00)∗∗∗ 1.17 (0.00)∗∗∗ 2.01 (1.06)∗
Age -0.32 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.11 (0.13) -0.15 (0.10)
Intangibility 0.00 (0.88) -0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.07 (0.06)
Listed -5.44 (0.40) -9.09 (0.33) 0.50 (12.94)
Leverage -0.06 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.05 (0.03)∗
Herﬁndahl 1.93 (0.00)∗∗∗ 1.58 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.39 (3.03)
Growth 0.04 (0.03)∗∗ 0.00 (0.90) -0.001 (0.003)
Intercept -6.42 (0.14) -13.73 (0.00)∗∗∗ -36.12 (16.91)∗∗
R2 0.04 0.17 0.01
F-value /χ2 17.78∗∗∗ 115.97∗∗∗ 14.08
Hausman 164.63∗∗∗ 104.96∗∗∗ 11.80
Number of obs. 8584 10718 639
Controlling group deﬁned as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
37Table 8
Multiple controlling shareholders and market values
M o d e l1 M o d e l2
Controlling group: Minimum stake 5 Largest
Regression type: Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q




50-60%*2M 0.22 (0.42) 0.09 (0.81)
50-60%*3M 0.83 (0.37)∗∗ -0.16 (0.30)
Contestability 0.05 (0.35) 0.08 (0.37)
Size -2.02 (0.18)∗∗∗ -2.05 (0.19)∗∗∗
Age 0.10 (0.05)∗ 0.08 (0.05)
Intangibility -0.03 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.01)∗∗
Leverage 0.04 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.04 (0.007)∗∗∗
Herﬁndahl -0.48 (0.33) -0.49 (0.35)
Growth 0.01 (0.008) 0.01 (0.008)




Number of obs. 211 211
Model 1 deﬁnes controlling group as the minimum stake group, while
Model 2 deﬁnes the controlling group asthe 5 largest shareholders
group.*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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